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Response to Case Study Two (national energy mix): Renewable 
energy targets 
2. The October 2014 European Council agreed that the EU should cut its 
greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% by 2030 compared to 1990 and that this 
should be delivered through a range of measures including renewable energy: “An 
EU target of at least 27% is set for the share of renewable energy consumed in the 
EU in 2030. This target will be binding at EU level.” This contrasts to the 20% 
renewable target by 2020 which has binding national targets for each Member 
State. 
 How could a governance mechanism assist the EU to deliver its stated 
policy, including not only the 27% renewables target but the overarching 
40% emissions reduction target which relies in part on the renewables 
target? 
 
1. In our research on Romania and Bulgaria we have found that governance 
mechanisms in the form of binding national targets played a significant 
role in these countries reaching their national 2020 renewable targets by 
2013, seven years early. This was not an unconditional success though as 
support for renewable energy was withdrawn as soon as the targets 
were reached. Energy governance at the time was focused on facilitating 
the development of wind and solar projects through cost and risk shifting 
measures like the reallocation of risk from producers to electricity 
distribution companies. There was a failure to address other important 
issues related to energy systems in these countries. Specifically there are 
important systemic and technical barriers to energy system change and a 
transition towards a low carbon energy future. These include requiring 
and providing support for electricity network development and upgrade 
(both transmission and distribution). This incurs substantial costs, which 
has so far been prohibitive in terms of introducing higher levels of 
intermittent renewables in both countries. 
2. The strategic importance of the technical inadequacy of the electricity 
grid (i.e. the grid capacity to carry variable wind and solar power) in both 
Romania and Bulgaria has led to the full reversal of all incentives 
introduced through EU legislation, only a few years after they came into 
force. Therefore a combination of hard legislation for the development 
and upgrade of national electricity networks is required to complement 
and enable existing 2030 targets. For example, this could include 
specifying technical standards for national electricity grids, not only in 
terms of compatibility with other countries but also in terms of technical 
performance in relation to intermittent renewables and energy demand 
(i.e. the introduction of smart grids technologies). 
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3. On the other hand countries like the UK have seen a growing interest and 
increase of non-traditional business models for renewable energy and 
energy with lower greenhouse gas emissions. These may include 
innovative governance mechanisms, commonly referred to as social 
innovations, taking the form of community energy projects and local 
initiatives, as well as non-traditional mixtures of public and private 
funding and finance. These non-traditional business models for energy 
projects and services tend to be non-centralised and ad-hoc, and are 
successful where there is local capacity to organize and/or need for the 
provision of energy services irrelevant of the strength of the economic 
case for them (i.e. driven by issues such as environmental considerations 
and fuel/energy poverty and vulnerability). However, such projects often 
struggle to sustain themselves as they rely on individuals’ capacities (and 
could often involve volunteering) and mostly use support from local 
authorities.  
4. Therefore, a governance mechanism which provides flexibility and 
support for non-traditional business models for energy services, and 
which builds on existing capacities at subnational levels (i.e. local, urban, 
municipal, communities) could contribute to the continued growth of 
renewable projects, irrelevant of national targets. Such a governance 
mechanism could include a variety of tools like the introduction of 
regional and/or municipal funding mechanisms for the development of 
non-traditional renewable energy projects zones, in the spirit of Catapult 
Centers in the UK and creative zones. These government and local 
authorities’ sponsored initiatives provide financial incentives, provision 
of capacity building activities with focus on greenhouse gas emissions 
reductions, and shared learning between individual projects.  
5. Such governance mechanisms could provide vital capacity building 
opportunities for all EU countries; for example in Bulgaria and Romania 
there are currently very limited incentives and measures in support of 
renewable projects, for example the lack of community energy projects; 
and address the problem of limited domestic support for these projects 
which we argue is necessary for coalition-building around renewable 
technologies and the social acceptance of a potential increase in the short 
term cost of energy. Such a governance mechanism would require an 
active role for national and EU energy regulators in ensuring consistency 
in the treatment of non-traditional business models and support their 
emergence and diffusion. Furthermore, non-traditional business models 
may cross sector boundaries and include areas that are not regulated. 
This will require a higher level of regulatory flexibility than currently 
experienced in most Member States.  
6. Our research on the newer Member States (in particular Romania and 
Bulgaria) has shown that the key mechanism for effective 
implementation and compliance with the EU’s Directive on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources (EU 
2009/28/EC) has been the binding targets at national level. Before these 
targets were introduced, the legal transposition alone of previous 
2001/77/EC Directive did not have any significant effect in practice in 
terms of level of investment or growth in the renewable energy sectors. 
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The result was a case of formal compliance without substantive 
implementation. Once the targets were negotiated with individual 
Member States, there was a significant change in the way political elites 
addressed policy implementation. New and extensive incentives were 
put in place to promote investment: for example in Bulgaria long-term 
contracts, set-up grants, and obligatory, zero cost and priority connection 
to the grid were implemented. In Romania the differentiation of green 
certificates on the basis of technology, mandatory annual quotas for 
green energy, and guaranteed priority access to the grid created a 
thriving market. 
7. An under if not completely unused mechanism is that of cooperation 
mechanisms between Member States and with third countries. The 
overproduction of renewable energy relative to targets explains why this 
mechanism is unlikely to be used to meet 2020 targets. Joint projects 
between member states and third countries have the potential to assist 
in the meeting of EU 2030 renewable targets whilst developing economic 
partnerships with neighbouring countries. There is also the option for 
one member state to provide financial support for a RES project in 
another member state and count (part of) the project’s energy 
production towards its own efforts. This can be efficient in taking 
advantage of renewable energy potential and directing funding to where 
it can be most effectively used.  
 
 
 How robust could a governance mechanism be without compromising 
Member State responsibility for their national energy mix? 
 
8. The continued use of certain existing governance mechanisms would be 
key for the European Commission to be able to monitor non-compliance 
in particular Member States, especially in the case of a new EU-wide 
binding target for 2030. These included initial National Renewable 
Energy Action Plans (Directive 2009/28/EC, Article 4(1)) coupled with 
progress reports every two years (Article 22) which are only running 
until 2020 and 2021 respectively. Currently, if a member state falls 
behind its indicative trajectory then it is required to submit an amended 
national action plan (Article 4(4)). If binding national targets are not 
going to be used, and we believe they are effective, then it will still be 
important to regularly measure progress towards the EU target, and offer 
support where national planning is considered insufficient. National 
Renewable Action Plans do provide a governance mechanism that is 
designed with the acknowledgement that there are different, nationally 
specific, paths towards meeting the Renewable Energy Directive. 
Member States then retain sovereignty in deciding how to meet the EU’s 
target, whilst offering strong support and guidance where necessary to 
provide a long-term planning perspective that can otherwise be lacking, 
and to measure and report on the implementation of plans. The 
mechanism needs to retain, and even strengthen, the existing ‘hard 
measures’ to enforce EU targets and retain obligations for Member States 
and sanctions for non-compliance in order to incentivise government 
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focus on the issue, enforce implementation and prevent defection from 
this EU agreement, as well as to reassure member states that others are 
carrying a fair share of the burden. These sanctions include the 
Commission’s right to launch infringement proceedings against non-
complying member states, and the European Court of Justice’s right to 
impose penalty payments. At present this can take several years before 
the non-compliance results in sanctions. 
 
Drawing the case studies together: Looking forward: 
3. What are the implications of a strengthened EU approach to energy 
governance? What are the implications of not making swift progress towards 
a new – and clear – governance system? 
 
9. In the absence of national-binding targets for 2030, coupled with 
domestic price increases for energy and protest from the heavy industry 
energy consumers, countries which have already reached their 2020 
targets, such as Romania and Bulgaria, have started to dismantle their 
incentive systems, creating an environment of extreme uncertainty for 
businesses and the withdrawal of some key investors in renewables. 
Furthermore, the impact of these developments on the energy-intensive 
industries has prompted certain Member states (even frontrunners such 
as Germany) to use feed-in-tariff exemptions which have effectively 
lowered energy costs for energy-intensive industries. In this context, the 
coupling of RES targets with the 40% emissions reduction target is 
important but not sufficient for keeping RES investment on the agenda. 
For example, the new member states have benefited from EU-wide 
greenhouse gas emissions targets and the solidarity principle by not 
having to make any cuts due to the collapse of their industry compared to 
1990 emissions levels. Moreover, due to the current economic crisis, 
investment in research and new technology have been cut across the EU, 
even in  Germany, which is the third largest wind energy market after 
China and the US. 
 
6. Should a new governance framework be enshrined in legislation? 
 
10. A clear and coherent policy framework is essential for investors in the 
RES sector. Most companies investing in renewables across the EU are 
also investors in other types of energy and their move to renewables is 
partly due to the attractiveness of the incentive systems, prompted by 
the national binding targets. As incentive systems are being dismantled 
across the EU, further commitment from the business sector has been 
linked to a stable legislative framework, enforceable EU-level targets and 
the linking of energy and climate change policies.   
11. Newer Member States like Bulgaria and Romania have limited support 
and capability to consider greenhouse gas emissions as part and parcel of 
energy governance at the national level. In many respects, greenhouse 
gas reduction policy is considered an external issue introduced by EU 
Directives and Policy. It is then important that a new governance 
framework be enshrined in EU legislation and transposed to the national 
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level. In newer Member States EU legislation, especially RES Directive 
played a decisive role in the development of renewables like wind and 
solar power. However, although these countries were quick to transpose 
EU Directives, they tend to lack sufficient domestic support for these 
energy sectors and a lot of the legal and financial incentives for wind and 
solar were quickly removed once the targets for 2020 were achieved. 
Therefore the continued development of these sectors and learning 
about the reduction of greenhouse gases through energy policy in these 
countries will greatly benefit from “hard” legislation, such as direct 
targets.  
 
  
6 | P a g e  
 
 
Contributors 
 
Dr. Ralitsa Hiteva is a Research Fellow at the Science Policy Research Unit 
(SPRU) at the University of Sussex. Ralitsa’s work focuses on energy governance, 
particularly the introduction of smart grids and renewables in the EU, and 
business models innovations for infrastructure. Ralitsa is a member of the Sussex 
Energy Group (which aims to identify ways of achieving the transition to 
sustainable, low carbon energy systems) and the International Centre for 
Infrastructure Futures (which provides structured, multidisciplinary systemic 
thinking about infrastructure interdependencies when developing new business 
models).  
 
Dr. Tomas Maltby is a Lecturer in International Politics at King’s College 
London, in the Department of Political Economy. His work focuses on EU-Russia 
energy relations, newer EU member states, the development of European energy 
security policy, and renewable and climate change policies.  Tomas is a member 
of the European Centre for Energy and Resource Security (EUCERS). 
 
Dr. Simona Davidescu is an Associate Lecturer in Public Policy at the University 
of York, Department of Politics. Her work focuses on environmental and energy 
policy in the European Union more broadly and sustainable development, 
renewable energy and the green economy in the new EU member states and 
Eastern Partnership countries in particular. Simona is also an Honorary 
Associate Researcher with the EU-Asia Institute at the ESSCA School of 
Management, Angers, France. 
 
